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ABSTRACT 
 
Cost of debt provides signals not only on how the firms are financed but it also 
indicates managers’ ability to increase the bottom line-income statement item. Thus, 
with a good corporate governance practice, firms are expected to experience optimum 
level of cost of debt. However, there is a general lack of studies that investigate this 
issue in the Gulf Council Countries (GCC), particularly the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE). Therefore, this research is conducted to investigate the relationship between 
characteristics of board of directors and cost of debts in UAE setting. The 
characteristics tested include board size, board independence, duality, board meetings, 
multiple directorships and major director ownership. This paper reports the results 
from a multivariate analysis on a dataset collected from the 2009 company annual 
reports of 62 non-financial UAE companies listed on the Dubai Financial Market and 
Abu–Dhabi Securities Exchange. The empirical results of this study found that the 
relationship between board size and board independence with cost of debts was in a 
negative direction but not significant. However, the results found that there was a 
positive relationship between CEO duality and cost of debts. Board meetings and 
multiple directorships of the board were the new variables discussed by this study, and 
the results found that there was a negative relationship between board meetings and 
multiple directorships with cost of debts. Although, the results of this study found a 
negative relationship between major director ownership and cost of debts, this 
relationship was not significant statistically. 
Key words: Cost of debts, corporate governance, board of directors characteristics, 
United Arab Emirates. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background of Study 
  
Internal capital is one of important financial sources for companies regardless of their 
size and legal form. It represents about 40 percent of total funding even among the 
most successful companies in the world. The other source of financing is through 
external borrowing which companies sometimes raise to increase its capital. This 
method helps companies to expand its business or to ensure the smooth running of the 
business (Abdulhafedh, 2006). Braunstein (2002) argues that companies that can 
borrow have much greater value than those companies that source their financing 
internally and several models have evaluated companies that used mixed financing as 
having more weight in the marketplace than companies use internal funds. 
It should however, be noted that excessive debts by companies lead to increase risks 
and would sometimes affect their operating profits and eventually will affect the 
shareholder’s wealth. Cost of debts is one of the burdens a  company will be exposed 
to as it raises its debt exposure; this cost is reflected in the interest  charged on the 
money borrowed, which is the amount of money the company pays for the privilege 
of using borrowed money to expand its business. Moreover, cost of debt is the 
interest that is paid on bank loans, bond options, and similar types of financial 
transactions (Ertugrul & Hegde, 2008).  
It is well recognized that cost of debts is considered an important issue for all 
companies due to several reasons. Firstly, companies can manage their finance 
effectively when they obtain the best interest rate. Secondly, calculating the cost of 
debt capital as it applies to incurring more debt can assist companies to weigh the 
The contents of 
the thesis is for 
internal user 
only 
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